Organised versus personal motivations and arguments – the example of phenomenology

This is just a small reflection on a phenomenon which we basically all know but which we forget at times because it involves two spheres of life which we usually keep separated in our minds.

I encountered this phenomenon lately when I was asked by an administrator of the facebook group Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy why I am coming to this group to criticize phenomenology.

For this administrator what I was doing was an entirely undoable thing: criticizing phenomenology! And even more: criticizing phenomenology in a group of fans and followers of phenomenology. In his eyes what I was doing was simply the attempt of “obstruction of business” of the phenomenologists, or at least he made it look like that. That is: he made me look like a malicious intruder.

I wonder if he himself reflected on organized versus the personal motivations and arguments when reproaching me of disturbance of domestic peace of the phenomenological home? Basically, the issues is as following: in the realm of personal thinking/discussion positive and negative, pro- and counterarguments have equal rights: If I think that something is a good idea, the probability that the very next person I meet is convinced that my idea is complete rubbish is very high. Furthermore, it will also be completely normal that she will also express her “negative” thoughts on my idea (that is if she really thinks that she is right).

Things are different in the social world of groups and organisations: There are phenomenological societies and Husserl societies for those who think that phenomenology is a good idea but there is no place where the idea that phenomenology is a bad or dysfunctional idea can be expressed and developed.

The phenomenon I am pointing at with this argument is that there are no anti-phenomenological societies and not anti-Husserl societies: in personal discussions positive and negative arguments can stand next to each other on the same footing. Human society, on the other hand is organized in a way that favours positive arguments and discriminates arguments which speak against somethings.

Hence the astonishment of the administrator of the facebook group Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy is understandable: his facebook group is an organisation were fans of phenomenology can gather. People who think that phenomenology is not a good idea will express their thinking by just by not participating in this group, and by possibly becoming members of a group of analytical philosophers instead. Criticism is expressed in a tacit way, not by speaking out openly.

Or, as I prefer to express it: there are simply no anti-phenomenological and anti-Husserlian societies – therefore, there is no place in society for the idea that Husserlian phenomenology is badly conceived and dysfunctional.

With this assertion, I believe to be talking about the same thing Sophie Loidolt called “spaces of meaning” in her article: Sophie Loidolt: “Sinnräume. Ein phänomenologisches Analyseinstrument, am Beispiel von Hannah Arendts Vita activa”, DZPhil 2020; 68(2): 167–188. https://doi.org/10.1515/dzph-2020-0011:

“The term “spaces of meaning” indicates how the unfolding of certain activities simultaneously creates and structures spaces and meaningful orientation which involves a certain temporality, spatiality, corporeality, and intersubjectivity.”” (Sophie Loidolt, op. cit.)

So, some kind of Husserl society, or also the facebook group Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy create a social space in which phenomenology appears to be meaningful to the members of this group or organisation. Being “meaningful” means here that it suppresses doubts on the un-meaningfulness of phenomenology by not allowing discussions about the idea that phenomenology could be a misconception in general.

This has grave consequences: Basically, we would think that the question whether phenomenology is a good thing at all has already been discussed by phenomenologists, and that the reason why phenomenological societies exist is because they have already decided – after discussing this topic extensively – that phenomenology is a good idea. The reason why we would think that is because pro- and counterarguments have equal rights in individual/personal thinking and stand next to each other.

However, when we move from individual/existential to social/organized thinking we learn that a phenomenological society, or a phenomenological facebook group, is a social place (an organized “space of meaning”) where it is not possible at all to discuss the question whether phenomenology makes sense at all because only individuals who are convinced that phenomenology makes sense are admitted to participate in phenomenological organisations.

What we can learn from this is that in public discourse opinions are strongly biased because the so-called advocatus diaboli, the opinion which speaks against an established opinion, is not provided with a place in society: as many anti-phenomenological societies would be needed as there are phenomenological societies in order for the non-specialists and laypersons to get a balanced impression of what phenomenology is.

Why phenomenologists do not talk with living phenomenologists

In the publication I quoted in my last blog entry, Fernandez, Anthony Vincent. (forthcoming). The Subject Matter of Phenomenological Research: Existentials, Modes, and Prejudices. Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1106-0, the author wonders why phenomenologists do not discuss with each other but prefer to discuss with phenomenologists who are already dead:

“…a close examination of the contemporary literature reveals that most of the constructive discourse in phenomenology—both critical and complementary—occurs between phenomenologists and their predecessors or between phenomenologists and figures from other contemporary disciplines. There is comparatively little engagement among contemporary phenomenologists themselves, with most references to contemporaries amounting to little more than a nod of recognition in the course of advancing one’s own project. While I cannot establish a definitive cause for this state of affairs, it seems to be morestraightforward and more rewarding to engage with one’s phenomenological predecessors or with researchers in other disciplines than with one’s contemporaries.” (Anthony Vincent Fernandez, op. cit.)

So, Anthony Fernandez is unable to “establish a definitive cause for this state of affairs”. I think that with the background of our little reflection on the social organisation of motivations and arguments we are better prepared to give an account of this phenomenon:

Imagine, that you are a lonesome philosopher interested in phenomenology. Other philosophers who are against phenomenology do not argue against phenomenology – they are just organised in other philosophical circles. Hence, the only possibility for you to engage with what you want to engage with (that is: phenomenology) is to find other phenomenologists and associate with them. But this comes at a cost: if they feel offended by you they will exclude you from their groups and you will stand in the cold and gnash your teeth. So, you will have to treat them with velvet gloves.

Furthermore, if you want to engage with phenomenology in the long term you will need the financial means to be able to do that. That means that you will need an employment at an institute of philosophy of a university. This means that your task will consist in make yourself respected by your peers by supporting the common cause of phenomenology, and your peers are united in phenomenological and Husserl societies. This is a difficult task because it means “advancing one’s own project”, as Fernandez puts it, without offending the others, which can only be done by not criticising them and giving them “nods of recognition” instead, as Fernandez puts it – for if any hostility arises you will not get a job.

The central issue is: if it is not possible to criticise your peers (because your job perspective depend on them confirming your qualifications) no real discussion is possible. If only positive and no negative opinions are allowed, what can be experienced in phenomenological publications or talks is just the appearance of discussion, not real discussion.

With this we have provided a cause for why “[t]here is comparatively little engagement among contemporary phenomenologists themselves” (Fernandez). The same sociological/organisational approach is also capable for giving us a causal explanation why “most of the constructive discourse in phenomenology—both critical and complementary—occurs between phenomenologists and their predecessors” (Fernandez). Well, the reason is easy to understand: because the predecessors are dead and therefore cannot feel offended.

This argument underlines the importance of death in the (social) business of philosophy: philosophers need to be dead in order to allow for the proper study of their ideas. Only if they are not alive anymore, and if they are unable anymore to deny academic positions to their successors, it is possible to study their thoughts with some kind of neutrality or balance. Imagine a world where human beings would not die: academic philosophy would be impossible or it would have to be reinvented to function in a totally new way.

Now, we have answered with ease Fernandez’ two questions for which he as unable to “establish a definitive cause”. The method to do this is easy: by moving from the factual level to the sociological/organisational level of things. An individual/a person tends to think factually, and therefore she does not have the idea that the cause could lie on the level of social organisation of motivations and ideas.

The administrator of the facebook group Phenomenology and Continental Philosophy, on the other side was so much a social being that it was inconceivable for him that I was thinking on the factual level and that I was critisizing phenomenology. It was clear to him that if anybody walks around critisizing phenomenology so harshly and fundamentally he would never get an academic job, and therefore he was completely unable to understand why I was doing that.

Well, the precondition for me to be able to critisize phenomenology, and to even dare to critisize living phenomenologists, is because I am not looking for an academic job. If I was working on a career in a philosophy department, I would also have to “eat chalk” in order to make my voice soft like the wolf in the fairy tale of the brothers Grimm:

“’We will not open the door,’ cried they, ’you are not our mother. She has a soft, pleasant voice, but your voice is rough; you are the wolf!’ Then the wolf went away to a shopkeeper and bought himself a great lump of chalk, ate this and made his voice soft with it.” (https://www.authorama.com/grimms-fairy-tales-37.html)

I started my little essay by saying that this is a reflection concerning an issue which you most probably already know: There is one level of discussion where we critisize each other mercilessly in order to find the truth – the factual level; and there is another level of discussion where we just try to look good in the eyes of others, and where not truth but their positive judgment of our person is our only goal – the level of social behaviour and organized motivations and arguments. We are well acquainted with both of these levels; however, the difficulty lies in thinking them together. Because academic philosophers arguing in their publications and talks on the level of organized motivations and arguments will pretend to move themselves on the factual level – and they will feel offended when being pointed at the fact that they are not really discussing a problem but rather trying to please their peers.

However, this blog entry is not aimed for academic philosophers but for laypersons and for naive students at the beginning of their studies of philosophy: Please keep in mind when reading publications of philosophers or when listening to their talks that it might seem like they are thinking about things and problems (or about phenomena) but in reality they are thinking about how to please their peers without accidentally offending them.

And they arguments you will encounter therefore are strongly imbalanced: there are many arguments for phenomenology and seemingly no arguments against phenomenology because there are no societies against phenomenology, no philosophical departments against phenomenology and no professorships against phenomenology. Because if there were academic jobs against phenomenology, for sure some people would try to get these job, and they would develop complex and interesting arguments about why Husserl’s phenomenology is nonsense. However, because there are no societies against something the opposing side of whatever idea is not illuminated by the light of study.

Leave a comment